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How have external shocks affected the LA region? To what extent such shocks relate to 
US domestic conditions? Has the region engaged in procyclical or countercyclical 
monetary and fiscal policy in response to external shocks? In this paper we address 
these questions through an empirical exercise that involves the identification of US 
domestic structural shocks as LA external shocks, in a two-block model. We find that 
domestic US fluctuations have a significant impact on commodity prices, and such 
effect heavily conditions LA capital inflows and LA performance in terms of economic 
activity, inflation, domestic currency movements, and reserve accumulation. There is no 
clear evidence that regional fiscal policy has been countercyclical. On the contrary, 
monetary policy reactions have been visibly countercyclical, driven in part by the 
impact of capital flows. Capital outflows also seemed to have played an important role 
in reducing banking currency mismatches in the context of domestic currency 
depreciations. 
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I. Introduction 
 
The consequences of the sub-prime crisis were financial and real and hit both, advanced 
and developing countries. In the case of Latin American (LA) countries, most of them 
exhibited a quick recovery in terms of their performance. Authors such as Corbo and 
Schmidt-Hebbel (2013) have argued that the resilience to this crisis has been the result 
of a greater growth explained by the adoption of more prudent macroeconomic policies. 
These policies, mostly based on rules, were implemented basically in three directions: 
increasing international reserves to act as buffers against external shocks; applying more 
countercyclical policies and deepening capital and financial markets1. 
 
On the other hand, papers such as Izquierdo, Romero and Talvi (2008), and Addler and 
Magud (2013), tend to view the performance of the region more closely related to the 
behavior of external factors. Izquierdo, Romero and Talvi (2008) associate the growth 
performance of the region with a pooled of external variables (including terms of trade 
of LA countries). Addler and Magud (2013) claim that an adequate metric of terms of 
trade booms, i.e. the income windfall, reveals that the LA region in the last decade has 
been exposed to a larger windfall than in the seventies. This finding suggests that the 
improvement in fundamentals is mainly driven by the size of the windfall.  
 
As it is stated, the inclination for one of these two views could be settled empirically by 
determining how much of the good performance of the region is actually related to the 
behavior of commodity prices and other external factors. Nonetheless, the empirical 
evidence available does not seem to be convincing enough to bring academics to a one 
common vision. Another question raised in this discussion is how monetary policy of 
advanced economies, in particular the US, has affected the performance of the region. 
There are two potential distinct stories in the literature on this regard. On one hand, 
there is the idea that rising commodity prices and capital inflows might have part of 
their explanation in recent expansionary monetary policy actions of US (Anzuini et. al 
2012 and Akyuz 2011). So, LA performance could be indirectly benefited by 
expansionary monetary policy shocks, through positive trade or capital account 
balances. On the other hand, Canova (2005) claims that US monetary policy shocks 
have huge impacts on LA countries mainly through movements in local interest rates 
(interest rate channel). In his investigation, expansionary US monetary policy shocks 
have a detrimental effect on LA performance. 
 
The above considerations, and the premise that LA countries are heavily exposed to 
external shocks, compel to carefully evaluate the role of these shocks on LA 
performance. But these external shocks seem to be intertwined with the US economy, 
not only because of its relative size and influence in the global economy, but also 
because of its potential connections with commodity prices. Therefore, the primary 
objective of this paper is to provide empirical evidence of the effects of US domestic 
shocks on LA performance in main policy areas: monetary, fiscal and external. On a 
general ground, this empirical exercise will answer, first, to what extent domestic US 
shocks have affected the behavior of commodity prices, and second, how the 
adjustments in the US economy and commodity prices have impacted the LA region. At 
                                                 
1 This perception is also related to a former work of Loayza and Radatz (2007) that claim that structural 
country characteristics, such as labor market flexibility and financial openness, have reduced the external 
vulnerability of emerging economies. 
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a more detailed level, this evidence will provide an interpretation on whether the region, 
as a whole, has engaged in procyclical or countercyclical monetary and fiscal policy.  
 
Since the evaluation of US shocks into the region can be traced at a country basis, 
estimation results can also determine if particular countries did not follow the regional 
tide in terms of their responses, and what macroeconomic conditions, if any, might be 
responsible for such behavior. The answer to these questions addresses the concerns 
about the degree of heterogeneity in LA economies, an issue partially advanced by 
Canova (2005), but not fully exploited since then in a single econometric setting.  
 
The methodology to answer the above questions combines elements of the dynamic 
factor model and structural analysis within a two block model: the LA region and its 
external sector2.  The LA region is modeled through a dynamic factor model that 
incorporates three weakly exogenous variables: commodity prices, US output growth 
and a measure of industrial activity from the rest of the world. The external sector to LA 
is portrayed through a structural VAR (SVAR) that combines US variables and 
commodity prices. Connections between the two blocks are allowed through two main 
channels: the potential contemporaneous correlation of residuals, and the presence of 
commodity prices and US growth in the LA dynamic. Identification of US domestic 
shocks is carried out using sign restrictions. At a technical level, the model structure can 
also be related to the FAVAR literature, but applied at a regional level.  
 
One important piece of the model is the set of variables included for the LA analysis: 
the blend of basic macroeconomic variables and a proxy to monthly net accumulated 
capital inflows for 10 LA countries (Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Colombia, Chile, 
Ecuador, México, Perú, Uruguay y Venezuela). Basic macroeconomic variables range 
from indicators of performance in the goods, monetary and stock market, through 
indicators of conditions in the external, fiscal and banking sector. 
 
Econometric results indicate that US domestic shocks have significantly affected 
commodity prices. Channels of transmission from the US economy to commodity 
markets are multiple, and do not seem to involve the behavior of a unique variable. 
These commodity price movements have triggered commercial and capital flows, both 
of which have translated into huge aggregate demand shocks for the LA region. As a 
consequence, adjustments in international reserves and foreign exchange rates have also 
taken place. From the point of view of regional policies, monetary policy has been 
visibly countercyclical. On the contrary, there is no clear evidence that fiscal policy has 
been countercyclical. In the context of domestic currency depreciations, capital outflows 
seemed to have also played a role in automatically reducing currency mismatches. 
 
There is a considerable body of the literature currently developing on the subject of the 
recent LA performance. Other papers, such as Ceballos et. al (2012), De Gregorio 
(2013), Melo and Rincón (2013), Talvy and Munyo (2013), and  Vegh and Vuletin 
(2013) have, in fact, contributed to partially answer the questions posed by this 
research. References to these papers will be addressed along the discussion. The 
contributions of this research can probably be framed in terms of applying econometric 
time series techniques that deal more adequately with the pervasive endogeneity 
problem. 
                                                 
2 This choice is not new in the literature and it relates to Canova 2005.  
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General results of this research also relate tangentially with other topics in the literature. 
For instance, because of the role of capital flows in the interpretation of results, this 
paper relates to works addressing the determinants of capital inflows and the resulting 
policy responses, such as Reinhart and Reinhart (2008), Cardarelli et al. (2009) and 
Ahmed and Zlate (2013). This paper also relates to the literature studying the global 
impacts of US shocks, as for instance, Bagliano and Morana (2012) and Eickmeier and 
Bai (2011). While Bagliano and Morana (2012) identify several (univariate) US shocks 
and evaluate their effect on a large set of countries through factors, Eickmeier and Bai 
(2011) determine the international effect of US credit supply shocks through a GVAR 
model. Although these papers identify different US shocks and transmission 
mechanisms, the main agreeing point is the relevance of US shocks for explaining 
fluctuations of both, advanced and emerging economies.  
 
Econometrically, there is also a large body of the literature using either sign restrictions 
to identify structural shocks and/or factors to convey large sets of data. Examples of 
these types of studies for the US or UK economy are: Bernanke, Boivin and Eliaz 
(2005), Mumtaz and Surico (2009), Eickmeier and Hofmann (2013) and Buch, 
Eickmeier and Prieto (2014). This investigation is the first one applying this 
combination of techniques for analyzing the LA region as a whole. 
   
The structure of this research is the following. In the next section we provide a rational 
for our modeling strategy, and determine the conditions for identifying structural 
shocks. Section III explicitly addresses the structure of the model and the main 
estimation issues. Sections IV and V elaborate on the presentation and interpretation of 
econometric results with regard to the questions posed. That is, section IV presents the 
impact of US shock on the US economy and commodity prices, while section V 
elaborates on the results of the LA region, emphasizing endogenous policy responses. 
Section VI refers to the drivers of country heterogeneity in impulse responses. Summary 
of the main messages of the paper are in section VII. 
 
 
II. External (structural) shocks to the LA region 
 
The LA region has been subject to important changes in external factors or conditions in 
the last decade. The definitions of such factors in the literature may vary depending on 
the questions that are being answered. For instance, Izquierdo, Romero and Talvi (2008) 
construct an index of external conditions that contains information on terms of trade, 
yield spreads (with respect to long US yields) and long US yields. Other authors refer to 
these external conditions as the behavior of commodity prices or as merely financial 
conditions, typically summarized by the volatility index of the stock market (VIX).  
 
The main problem of associating external conditions to single variables is that these 
measures, although informative, do not provide a comprehensive story of economic 
events. On one hand, these variables are mostly endogenous ones that are potentially 
affected by other conditions or variables, which ultimately provide an economic 
rationale for their behavior. Also, changes in single variables do not allow a proper 
identification of the conditions that drive them. In this paper, external conditions to the 
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LA region are defined in terms of structural shocks of the US economy3. In this way, 
the problems of endogeneity and economic interpretation of unexpected movements in 
external variables are directly addressed. However, it is not straightforward to figure out 
what US and other external variables need to be considered for the SVAR analysis and 
how these structural shocks are connected to the region.  
 
The SVAR for the US economy is based on 6 key variables: US economic activity 
growth, US inflation, US monetary policy indicator, S&P500 index growth, implicit 
stock market volatility index (VIX), and commodity prices growth4. We identify four 
structural shocks for the US economy: supply, real demand, monetary and financial 
shock. These shocks constitute the external shocks to the LA region. On the other hand, 
the LA region is modeled through a dynamic factor model (DFM). Factors summarize 
country level information for 10 LA countries (Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Colombia, 
Chile, Ecuador, México, Perú, Uruguay y Venezuela), and regional information from 
regionally aggregated indicators. The way these regional indicators are constructed is 
shown in appendix 1. Variables of this block consider relevant information on key 
economic sectors and add up to a total of 217 variables. In this modeling, we also 
incorporate two weakly exogenous variables, price of commodities and US economic 
growth, to adequately control for the impact of external factors on the region.  
 
This econometric set up, and the treatment of the two blocks as a single system, allows 
drawing two types of connections between external shocks and the LA region. The first 
connection we introduce is through commodity prices and US economic activity. By 
construction, we assume the existence of full endogeneity between the US economy and 
commodity prices. This presumption of endogeneity is justified on two grounds: the size 
and importance of the US economy in global conditions and, the work of Anzuini et. al 
(2012), which has stressed that US monetary policy has also had an impact on the price 
of commodities. Therefore, while the US economic activity and the index of commodity 
prices are treated as endogenous variables for the US economy, they represent two 
weakly exogenous variables for the region5. At the level of the transmission mechanism, 
as long as US domestic shocks have an impact on the real activity and commodity 
prices, these shocks will also be transmitted to LA variables through their mean. 
 
The second and most important connection between US shocks and the LA region is 
through the contemporaneous correlations of residuals. That is, the US economy and the 
LA block, although seemingly unrelated on their structure, are correlated at the level of 
their residuals, as in SUR models. Intuitively, this entails stating that unexpected 
movements in any variable of the US block can have a direct contemporaneous impact 
on endogenous LA variables through factors.  The inclusion of this type of connection 
between the two blocks allows capturing an endogeneity structure that is far richer than 
that of GVAR models. This is because it exploits the non-systematic part of 
transmission mechanisms. 
 
Next, we turn to the identification strategy. For the identification of supply and real 
demand shocks in the US, we define them in term of their effect on the aggregate goods 
                                                 
3 This approach is not new in the literature and resembles Canova (2005), which identifies US structural 
shocks as an important source of shocks to the region. 
4 All variations are computed on annual basis. 
5 This treatment of commodity prices departs from Canova (2005), where commodity prices are presumed 
a weakly exogenous variable to both, the US economy and the LA region.  
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market. That is, while a supply shock moves industrial production and inflation in the 
opposite direction, a real demand shock moves them in the same direction. 
 
For the case of the monetary shock, the problem that arises is that US monetary policy 
has partly been implemented by movements in the federal fund rate, and since the end 
of 2008, by unconventional actions of the monetary authority. These two strategies have 
been applied in mutually exclusive time periods, and ex-ante, it makes difficult to define 
a monetary instrument that fits the whole estimation sample (2004-2012). In fact, if 
monetary policy is measured through movements in either one of the instruments (the 
federal fund rate or Fed’s asset purchases), residual correlations in the sample might be 
distorted.  
 
One way to overcome this problem is to find a synthetic indicator of the stance of US 
monetary policy that reflects actions taken on both instruments. The simplest way to do 
this is by combining information on the federal fund rate and on Fed’s asset purchases. 
In some papers in the literature, such as in Baumeister and Benati (2012), it has been 
argued that the spread between the long term Treasury yield and the federal fund rate is 
a suitable measure for the stance of the quantitative easing. In particular, it is claimed 
that expansionary monetary policy leads to a reduction in this spread. This is certainly 
true for the period subsequent to 2011, when the maturity extension program took place 
and Fed’s purchases were directed to long term securities. Nonetheless, if we consider 
computing this spread for the whole estimation period, the relationship between the 
spread and monetary policy completely reverses. This is the case, because in normal 
times, reductions of the spread are associated with contractionary (and not 
expansionary) monetary policy. Therefore, we use the ratio between the assets held by 
the Fed and the quantity of money in the economy (M2) as a more adequate indicator of 
the stance of the unconventional monetary policy. 
 
Computationally, the measure of the synthetic stance of US monetary policy for the 
whole sample is constructed as the principal component of the two monetary policy 
instruments and the growth rate of real balances. The introduction of real balances 
assures that whenever a monetary policy instrument changes, such change goes along 
with movements in the appropriate direction of real balances. In fact, as argued by 
Canova (2005), it is exactly the behavior of real balances what distinguishes a real 
demand from a monetary policy shock. The resulting measure assigns a positive weight 
to the relative size of Fed’s assets and the growth of real balances, and a negative 
weight to the federal fund rate. As a result, any increase of this indicator signals a 
potential expansionary monetary stance. Figure 1, compares the behavior of the two 
(conventional and unconventional) monetary policy instruments and the synthetic 
monetary policy indicator. The behavior of this synthetic indicator seems to provide a 
reasonable description of the stance of monetary policy. In this context, the 
identification of a monetary policy shock refers to simultaneous movements of the 
monetary policy indicator, the growth of real activity and inflation, all in the same 
direction. 
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Figure 1. Monetary policy indicators 
  
 
 
The last structural shock identified in the external block refers to a potential financial 
shock to the region. Papers such as Ahmed and Slate (2013) has stressed the importance 
of the VIX index as a driver of capital inflows, while Melo and Rincón (2013) has 
found significant responses of nominal exchange rates and several stock prices in the 
region to changes in the VIX. In this sense, it seems to be some degree of consensus 
about the fact that this implicit US stock volatility plays a role in the performance of the 
region. This is because the VIX is interpreted as a general measure of financial 
uncertainty or perceived risk that relates to portfolio re-arrangements6. Nonetheless, it is 
not clear which is the precise transmission mechanism that enables this connection. That 
is, empirically speaking, it is not clear what variables mediate between VIX changes 
and regional performance. 
 
One possible, but not exclusive, channel is through commodity prices. In this case, 
portfolio reallocations might induce reductions in assets prices, but in particular, 
commodity prices, as a generalized flight to safety of global capitals takes place. This 
connection is also built on the empirical findings that support the thesis that increased 
financialization of oil and other commodity future markets has translated into stronger 
connections between stocks and commodity markets7. Therefore as a rise in uncertainty 
takes place, commodity prices drop, possibly leading too to capital outflows from 
emerging economies, such as LA ones. In particular, in our SVAR, we identify a 
contractionary financial shock as a simultaneous increase in the VIX index and a 
reduction in commodity prices.  
 
A summary of the identifying conditions imposed on impulse responses to structural 
shocks are presented in the table 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 Adrian and Shin (2010) argue that risk-management constraints reduce the risk appetite of financial 
intermediaries in times of high VIX.  
7 Fattouh, Kilian and Mahadeva (2012) survey several empirical papers that have built the case for higher 
correlations between commodity futures and stock markets.  
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Table 1. Identifying conditions of external (structural) shocks to LA region  
 Expansionary 
supply shock 
Expansionary 
real demand 
shock 
Expansionary 
monetary 
shock 
Contractionary 
financial 
shock 
US activity growth + + +  
US inflation - + +  
US monetary policy indicator   +  
US stock market volatility (VIX)    + 
Commodity price growth    - 
   
 
III. Structure of the model 
 
As already mentioned, the econometric modeling assembles two apparently unrelated 
blocks: the US and the LA block. 
 
The structure of the US block is described next. Define a column vector of endogenous 
variables for the US economy  PCMVIXSTKMPPYZ USUSUSUSUS ,,,,, , composed 
by US economic activity growth ( USY ), US inflation ( USP ), US monetary policy 
indicator ( USMP ), S&P500 index growth ( USSTK ), implicit stock market volatility 
index (VIX ), and commodity prices growth ( PCM ). Define also an indicator of the 
economic activity from the rest of the world ( RWY ), which is computed as the first 
principal component of the annual growth rate of industrial production indexes from 31 
advanced and emerging countries (including India, China and Russia), but different than 
the US and LA countries8. The dynamic properties of the endogenous variables in this 
system can be generally be described by the following VAR(1): 
 
US
t
RW
t
USUS
t
USUS
t eYBZZ   11        (1) 
 
where AUS is the companion form of the system, RWY is considered a weakly exogenous 
variable, and USe  refer to the reduced form residuals of the VAR. 
 
The LA block is built on a factor model explained next. Define LAX  as the set of LA 
country specific and regionally aggregated variables that describe the performance of 
the region. For our model LAX  has dimension 217N . Consider also a set of latent 
static factors F that describe the co-movement of LAX , such as: 
 
tt
LA
t FX           (2) 
 
where   is the loading matrix (Nxg) and   are the idiosyncratic errors, which might 
be weakly correlated. Likewise, factors follow a dynamic process represented by: 
 
LA
t
RW
t
LAUS
tt
LA
t eYBWCFF   111       (3) 
 
                                                 
8  These monthly statistics are obtained from the IMF global statistics.  
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where  PCMYW USUS ,  is a subset of USZ  that enters in this block as weakly 
exogenous variables, and  LAe  refers to the reduced form residuals, as in any VAR. The 
structure of equations (2) and (3) relates to an approximate dynamic factor model, as in 
Forni et. al (2009) and Forni and Gambetti (2010), but it also includes weakly 
exogenous variables. 
 
The complete dynamic system is assembled as a SUR model, in order to capture the 
potential relationships between reduced form residuals. Succinctly, this entails writing 
the system as: 
 
 t
RW
ttt eYZZ   11         (4) 
 
where  FZZ US , , A adequately combines information of  the matrices AUS, ALA, C 
and several zero-restrictions, B combines BUS and BLA, and  LAUS eee ,  is distributed 
normal with variance-covariance matrix  . In this context, structural shocks  LAUS uuu , , which have a diagonal variance-covariance matrix, come from the 
structural dynamic system: 
 
t
RW
ttt uYDZZ   111         (5) 
 
which relates with the reduced form system through the equalities:  D ,  
and ue  . A proper identification of structural shocks provides an estimation for  , 
based on the informational content of reduced form parameters. 
 
Estimation of (4) is carried out in a two-step procedure. First, we estimate model 
factors, and then, use them to estimate parameter coefficients in (4). Sample information 
runs from 2004 through 2012, which leaves the model with observations 108T . Since 
TN   , we can approximate F as the g first principal components of LAX , as stated in 
Bai and Ng (2002). Factor uncertainty is considered negligible for estimating parameter 
coefficients in (4), as in the FAVAR model of Bernanke, Boivin and Eliasz (2005). The 
number of factors (g) included in (4) is determined qualitatively: including the 
minimum number of factors that produce stable impulse responses to structural shocks, 
but avoiding an excessive volatility of impulse responses as the number of factor 
increases. We finally chose the first 6 principal components of XLA as the relevant 
factors, which explain around 73% of their joint variance9. This makes Z a vector of 12 
endogenous variables. The estimation of parameters in (4) is carried out through GLS 
estimation in order to improve estimators’ efficiency. The auto-regressive order of the 
system is determined looking at Schwarz and Hannan-Quinn criteria for each VAR 
block, systems (1) and (3). These criteria suggested the use of 1 lag in both cases. 
 
Impulse-responses of the system are stated in terms of responses to structurally 
identified shocks ( USu ). Identification of shocks is carried out imposing sign restrictions 
on impulse-responses. Details on how to perform sign restriction identification are 
provided in appendix 2.  
                                                 
9 With 5 or 7 factors, impulse responses are qualitatively similar and differences are negligible.  
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IV.  Impact of shocks on the US economy and commodity prices 
 
In this section, we analyze the impact of US shocks on the domestic economy, as a first 
step to characterize and evaluate structural shocks. Results are summarized in table 2. 
Accumulated impulse-responses are available in appendix 3. 
 
  Table 2. Impacts of US shocks in the domestic economy  
 Expansionary 
supply shock 
Expansionary real 
demand shock 
Expansionary 
monetary policy 
shock 
Contractionary 
financial shock 
Real 
activity 
growth 
Strong increase for 
almost two years 
Increase for one 
year Increase for one year 
Small drop for about 
six month 
Inflation Reduction for less than a year 
Increase for almost 
year and a half 
Increase for almost 
one year 
Reduction after six 
months 
MP stance 
Contractionary 
policy after one 
year 
Contractionary 
policy Expansionary policy 
Expansionary policy 
after three months 
Stock index 
growth 
Substantial rise 
after six months 
Negligible 
(marginal) rise for 
about half year 
Negligible 
(marginal) rise for 
about half year 
Negligible 
(marginal) drop for 
about half year 
Stock 
volatility 
Important reduction 
after six months 
Reduction for one 
year 
No significant 
response 
Substantial rise for 
one year 
Commodity 
price 
growth 
Initial reduction, 
and later increase Marginal increase Marginal increase 
Important drop for 
more than a year 
 
The first interesting finding is that all US domestic shocks affect commodity prices. 
This result is consistent with the one of Anzuini et. al (2012) that refers to the positive 
effect of an expansionary US conventional monetary policy on commodity prices. 
Likewise to their result, the effects of monetary policy shocks, although statistically 
significant, are not considerable. Nonetheless, our result is more general, since it is built 
on an indicator for the monetary policy stance that reflects decisions with both, 
conventional and unconventional instruments. So, also unconventional monetary policy 
decisions likely have a marginal effect on commodity prices. It is also a more general 
result, because there are three more US domestic shocks that relate to the behavior of 
commodity prices.  
 
In terms of the effects of these other shocks, we also find some relevant patterns. On 
one side, contractionary financial shocks, which directly relate to the uncertainty in US 
stock markets, have an important long lasting effect on commodity prices. In this case, 
the transmission of the shock might seem to work directly through the re-balance of 
global portfolios, and then translate into a negative aggregate demand shock to the US 
economy. On the other hand, positive supply shocks to the US economy initially 
diminish commodity prices, as if part of the greater supply of US goods also translates 
into a larger supply of commodities in global markets. But this effect is transitory, and 
probably, as aggregate US demand expands, the pressure on global commodity, and 
domestic prices, becomes positive.  
 
The general interpretation of these patterns is that all US fluctuations addressed end up 
having an impact on commodity markets. Nevertheless, one could additionally argue 
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that the channels of transmission from the US economy to commodity markets are 
multiple, and do not seem to involve the behavior of a unique variable. For instance, 
papers such as Frankel (2006) stressed the importance of declining US interest rates as a 
channel for observing higher commodity prices10. This does not seem to be the case for 
the last ten years, when increasing commodity prices can be observed either with 
expansionary or contractionary monetary policies11. It is not either the case, that rising 
commodity prices are exclusively observed with a vibrant US economy. In fact, as 
already suggested, a contractionary supply shock will drastically increase commodity 
prices, although temporarily. For instance, the strong increase of commodity prices 
prior august 2008 is mainly associated to the combined effects of contractionary supply 
shocks and expansionary real demand shocks, both of which had positive effects on 
commodity prices and inflation. Then after august 2008, the following drop of 
commodity prices is a combination of negative demand and financial shocks, summed 
up the impact of past contractionary supply shocks and some timid positive supply 
shocks that took place after the unraveling of the crisis12. 
 
Another interesting finding is that endogenous responses of monetary policy seem to 
operate in the expected directions. For instance, contractionary financial or real demand 
shocks trigger expansionary monetary policy responses few months after shocks 
occurred. Also a contractionary supply shock will bring about an expansionary 
monetary policy, once the positive effect of the shock on inflation has vanished. 
Another interesting result is that stock markets are always associated with positive real 
performance of the economy, but it responds more strongly to expansionary supply 
shocks. 
 
  
V. Impact of shocks on LA region: good luck or good policy? 
 
In this section, we analyze the impact of US shocks on the LA region as a whole. To 
interpret this empirical evidence, it is important to bear in mind two implications of the 
LA econometric modeling. First, because external shocks are supposed to affect all the 
countries in the region roughly at the same time, any response to those shocks should be 
captured by the co-movements of LA variables. This is the reason why factors are used 
as a mean to summarize all the LA information, country specific and regionally 
aggregated. The responses of the LA region “as a whole” refer to the responses of the 
regionally aggregated indicators through common factors. Therefore, any variation in 
variables not related to the selected static factors is attributable to idiosyncratic or 
country specific events that are not of interest for this research. The higher the share of 
factors’ (common component) variance on total variance of variables, the less important 
the behavior of the idiosyncratic component is, and more meaningful our results 
become. The share of all the variables’ variances explained by the selected factors (the 
common component) is available in appendix 4.  Second, even when discussing country 
specific responses to shocks, those responses are also tamed by the time co-movement 
                                                 
10 The empirical evidence of Frankel (2006) refers to 1950-2005.  
11 Rising commodity prices are observed for expansionary monetary policy shocks, but also for 
expansionary supply, real demand and financial shocks, where monetary conditions become 
endogenously contractionary and US federal fund rate rates could be rising. 
12 Although not shown, this description is based on the historical decomposition of commodity prices for 
each identified structural shock.  
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of LA variables. Therefore, heterogeneity is interpreted as the differences that arise in 
countries’ responses to common forces or shocks.  
 
Table 3 summarizes the impulse responses of aggregated regional indicators to 
structural US shocks. The analysis is described addressing different sectors in the 
economy: the aggregate goods market, and the external, fiscal, monetary and banking 
sectors. Accumulated impulse-responses are also available in appendix 5. 
 
Table 3. Impacts of US shocks in the LA region  
 Expansionary supply shock 
Expansionary 
real demand 
shock 
Expansionary 
monetary policy 
shock 
Contractionary 
financial shock 
Real activity 
growth 
Initial reduction, 
and later increase Marginal increase Marginal increase Important drop 
Inflation Initial reduction, and later increase Marginal increase Marginal increase Important drop 
Export growth Initial reduction, and later increase Marginal increase Marginal increase Important drop 
International 
reserves growth 
Initial reduction, 
and later increase Marginal increase Marginal increase Important drop 
Exchange rate 
(Dom/$) growth 
Initial increase, 
and later 
reduction 
Marginal decrease Marginal decrease Important rise 
Capital inflows 
indicator 
Initial reduction, 
and later increase Marginal increase Marginal increase Important drop 
Government 
expenditures 
growth 
Late reduction 
(but prior to 
increase in real 
activity) 
Marginal decrease No significant response 
Initial marginal 
increase and later  
important drop 
Fiscal balance 
(as share of 
expenditures) 
Initial no 
response, and later 
important increase
Marginal increase Marginal increase Late decrease 
Monetary rate 
change 
Initial (marginal) 
reduction, and 
later increase 
Marginal increase Marginal increase Important drop 
Loan rate 
change 
Initial reduction, 
and later increase Marginal increase Marginal increase Important drop 
Monetary 
aggregates 
growth 
Initial no response 
and later increase 
No significant 
response Marginal increase Important drop 
Stock market 
growth 
Initial no response 
and later increase No response No response 
Important late 
increase 
Foreign assets 
growth Initial increase Reduction Marginal reduction Increase 
Public debt 
growth 
Initial marginal 
increase and later 
reduction 
Reduction Reduction Late Increase 
Loans growth 
Initial marginal 
drop and later 
increase 
Marginal decrease Reduction Initial marginal increase  
Share of loans  Reduction No significant response 
No significant 
response 
No significant 
response 
Leverage 
Initial reduction 
and later increase  
(with loans) 
No significant 
response 
No significant 
response Important reduction 
Currency 
mismatch (A/L) 
growth  
Initial increase Reduction Marginal reduction Increase 
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Taking in consideration the patterns of commodity prices, it seems clear that the 
performance of the goods market and the external sector of the region (exports, 
international reserves, exchange rates and capital inflows) basically follow commodity 
prices adjustments. In other words, when domestic US shocks translate in rising 
commodity prices, both, real activity growth and inflation increase. The opposite takes 
place when commodity prices fall. That is, an increase in commodity prices enters the 
region as a positive aggregate demand shock that has the intensity and duration of the 
commodity price adjustment. 
 
This description of results is clearly consistent with the spread view in the literature that 
external factors have played a major role in the real growth of the region in the last 
decade. Nonetheless, such performance seem to rely more heavily on commodity prices 
than in any other variable, as opposed, for instance, to the results of Izquierdo, Romero 
and Talvi (2008), where growth performance is associated to a pool of external factors. 
The additional insight provided is that any adjustment in commodity prices behaves as 
an aggregate demand shock.  
 
What is the role played by capital inflows? Do they increase aggregate demand or are 
they the consequence of it? One way to interpret results is the following. Because 
shocks originate in the US, we are prone to believe that commodity price increases 
(drops) represent focal points for global capital movements that translate in regional 
capital inflows (outflows). Once they occurred, these capital inflows produce additional 
aggregate demand pressures, in the same direction of commodity prices. These 
additional pressures could take place through diverse channels: by directly increasing 
investment and consumption, by rising domestic banking credit or by simply increasing 
the quantity of money in the economy. In all these cases, the final impact of inflows is 
an increase in aggregate demand: a simultaneous increase in areal activity and inflation.  
 
Empirically, because the boost of aggregate demand and capital inflows take place 
simultaneously, one could also argue that capital inflows are simply the result of the 
greater economic growth. We take the stand of the first interpretation, because there is 
no clear theoretical reason to expect that rising commodity prices by themselves bring 
about an increase in inflation. For example, in the absence of capital inflows, growing 
commodity prices could have a positive effect on real activity but a negative effect on 
inflation, considering that intermediate imported production goods may become 
cheaper13. The fact that inflation is positively related with rising commodity prices 
indicates the existence of huge aggregate demand pressures that, theoretically, are 
clearly linked with capital inflows (see also the figure in appendix 6 for a qualitative 
association between capital inflows and inflation). Therefore, both, commodity prices 
and capital inflows, are the possible triggers for aggregate demand movements. This 
interpretation of the evidence is in line with Reinhart and Reinhart (2008) that points 
out that increasing commodity prices augment the likelihood of observing capital 
inflows.   
 
In terms of the other external variables, empirically, growing commodity prices are 
observed with a systematic accumulation of international reserves and domestic 
currency appreciations. These two events reinforce the hypothesis that capital inflows 
                                                 
13 In several studies about Venezuela, I have found that a simultaneous increase in oil prices and imports 
behaves as an expansionary supply shock.  
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play an important role in the interpretation of the results. Later in the document, this 
issue will be discussed in more depth. 
 
In the fiscal sector, the behavior of the fiscal balance is greatly synchronized with the 
behavior of commodity prices and real activity. That is, when external and domestic 
conditions improve, fiscal balances do so too. In this sense, fiscal financial results seem 
to be mostly endogenous with respect to the economic cycle, and do not depend on 
expenditure decisions. When referring to government expenditures, under certain 
circumstances, expenditures react in the opposite direction of the cycle: for US real 
demand and financial shocks, fiscal expenditures increase (decrease) when regional real 
activity falls (rises). Nonetheless, these responses are marginal. In particular, for the 
case of contractionary US financial shocks, expenditures grow marginally few months 
after the shock, but as regional real contraction deepens, expenditures end up falling too. 
For the US expansionary supply shock, the response of expenditures seems 
endogenously driven by the initial decrease in real activity. For the US monetary policy 
shock there is no response of expenditures. 
 
Our interpretation of results is that there is no clear evidence that regional fiscal policy 
has indeed been countercyclical. Since contractionary real demand and financial shocks 
are probably more observable in terms of US performance, then it is possible that LA 
fiscal authorities devote some effort to avoid their negative impact on regional growth. 
However, there presumably exist institutional rigidities that avoid a flexible 
management of fiscal expenditures in order to generate a proper countercyclical fiscal 
response. Later in the text, it will be shown that regional indicators are hiding a large 
degree of heterogeneity among country responses, and there are countries already 
implementing countercyclical fiscal policies. However, at this point, we want to argue 
that, as a region, LA has not engaged in a visible countercyclical fiscal policy.  
 
This interpretation of fiscal responses could be considered at odds with part of the 
literature recently developed. For instance, Vegh and Vulettin (2013) argue that some 
countries in the region (Chile, Brasil and Mexico) have become more countercyclical in 
terms of their fiscal policy with respect to the nineties. Their claim is based on the 
sample correlations between government spending and GDP. On the other hand, Corbo 
and Schmidt-Hebbel (2013), based on a cross section empirical strategy, state that the 
performance of the fiscal policy helped to soften the recession of 2008-2009. In both 
studies, authors were more inclined to analyze average performances with respect to 
past crises. In our view, there is no contradiction in acknowledging that fiscal responses 
might have improved with respect to prior crises, but the question that remains 
unanswered is whether such responses are the result of more favorable external 
conditions. In this matter, De Gregorio (2013) in his qualitative analysis of the LA 
performance to the recent crisis, points out to less binding fiscal liquidity constraints as 
a reason for a better fiscal performance. Our empirical evidence is more consistent with 
this view, since the noticeable improvements in fiscal balances due to favorable external 
conditions might have played a role in allowing some efforts in the direction of 
implementing more countercyclical fiscal policy. Nonetheless, these efforts are far from 
being definite. 
 
In terms of monetary policy, the short term money rate, which is used as a proxy of 
monetary policy actions, shows a clear positive association with the behavior of real 
activity and inflation. That is, monetary authorities seem to respond in the direction of 
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controlling aggregate demand pressures as external shocks translate in aggregate 
demand changes14. Because all countries in the sample, with the exception of Argentina, 
Ecuador and Venezuela, have implemented inflation targeting strategies, the 
countercyclical responses of monetary policy rates seem to be the natural behavior in 
the context of monetary institutions.  
 
Therefore, suggesting that monetary policy reactions have been clearly countercyclical 
seems to coincide with most of the papers in the literature, such as Corbo and Schmidt-
Hebbel (2013), De Gregorio (2013), and Vegh and Vulettin (2013). Nonetheless, the 
interesting discussion arises regarding the relationship between monetary policy and the 
external sector (exchange rate, international reserves and capital flows). The particular 
question that arises is whether the implementation of contractionary monetary policy 
has been a simple exercise of controlling aggregate demand, or has been influenced by 
the events or decisions in the external sector. 
 
Our interpretation of results is that positive commodity price shocks have caused huge 
increments in exports, but also have triggered important capital inflows, both of which 
led to observe significant reserve accumulations in the region. The rational for the 
accumulation of reserves is twofold: to acquire an insurance instrument for deterring 
speculative attacks, and to counterbalance the strong appreciation of domestic 
currencies, as De Gregorio (2013) points out. We cannot distinguish ex-ante which of 
the two reasons led to the accumulation of reserves, but can the empirical evidence 
contribute to the interpretation of events? Empirically, capital inflows, domestic 
currency appreciation and accumulation of reserves are observed simultaneously. This 
could suggest that reserve accumulation is importantly driven by foreign exchange 
interventions, which were meant to preclude an excessive domestic currency 
appreciation. Because reserve accumulation has a clear expansionary monetary effect, 
monetary authorities could either engage in sterilize interventions or increase monetary 
rates further15. This mix of policies, and other potential capital control measures, 
possibly endorsed the view that capital inflows were clearly related to external 
conditions, and that for instance, increasing domestic interest rates would not represent 
further incentives for capital inflows. The argument is symmetric for capital outflows.  
 
On the other hand, the implementation of inflation targeting strategies has forced 
countries to engage in more flexible exchange rate management in order to gain degrees 
of freedom for the exercise of monetary policy. In fact, most countries, with the 
exception of Argentina and Venezuela, have declared to promote floating exchange 
rates with controlled interventions. But, have capital inflows affected the degree of 
exchange rate adjustments? In appendix 6, we present the regional indicator for capital 
inflows and several flotation indexes, in the spirit of Calvo and Reinhart (2002), 
computed by countries, for the whole sample and relevant sub-periods. As shown, in 
average, higher levels of floatation started after 2007, when stronger regional capital 
                                                 
14 Another interesting result is that loans rates follow the same patterns as money rates. This could bring 
out the philosophical issue of whether the movements in monetary policy rates are the result of the greater 
demand of goods and credit in the economy or loan rates are influenced by the monetary policy rate. 
Although interesting, in this particular exercise, we cannot try to address this question because the timing 
of impulse responses seems identical. 
15 In our view, pursuing contractionary monetary policy can be considered an equivalent strategy to 
sterilized interventions. Montiel (2014) explains in details the costs associated to sterilized foreign 
exchange interventions and suggests that fiscal contractionary policy constitutes an alternative policy to 
capital inflows.  
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inflows were observed. In 2009-2010, although capital outflows were not as strong, 
floatation increased, probably because the impact of the crisis was not still pondered, 
and domestic currency depreciations were, on one side, not harmful for export growth, 
and on the other hand, not a threat from the point of view of inflation targeting 
objectives16. Comparing floatation indexes with and without interest rates variability, 
suggests that the variability of interest rate was extremely high during this period: 
interest rates suffer an intensive decline in early 2009 and a sudden increase during 
2010. After 2010, high levels of floatation have been maintained. 
 
Therefore, although capital flows have had an important influence in the magnitude of 
international reserve variability, exchange rate variability has been relatively larger and 
has increased since 2007. The influence of capital flows also pervaded monetary policy 
reactions, especially during 2009-2010. Nonetheless, it is not clear whether the impact 
of capital flows on monetary reactions works through an exacerbation of aggregate 
demand pressures or through the monetary effect of foreign exchange interventions, 
which may lead to stronger monetary policy reactions. Independently of the 
transmission mechanism, it seems that with the convergence to more flexible exchange 
rate systems, monetary policy adjustments have also become less intense than during 
critical capital outflows episodes. So, the exercise of monetary policy has been a 
discretional choice, driven by the desire of accomplishing a countercyclical policy, but 
also influenced by the impact of capital flows.  
 
Another element related to the above discussion, refers to the connection between 
capital inflows and the response of banking balance sheets. Results indicate that when 
external shocks bring about capital inflows and domestic currency appreciations, 
foreign asset positions of banks (denominated in domestic currency) shrink. This 
behavior could probably be related to the reduction of the nominal exchange rate, which 
makes assets denominated in domestic currency to decrease in value during capital 
inflows episodes. The question that arises is whether these adjustments in banking 
balance sheets are solely associated to modifications in valuation prices or are also 
related to real adjustments in foreign currency holdings. Do these adjustments come 
only from the asset side of the banking balance sheet or liabilities’ changes are also 
relevant?  
 
To answer this question, we look at the ratio between foreign assets and liabilities in the 
banking system, an indicator of currency mismatches, and evaluate its growth rate17. 
The response of this ratio to shocks is identical to that of foreign assets. This implies 
that during capital outflows, the ratio of asset to liabilities increases as large positions of 
banks in foreign assets grow, either because of an accumulation of assets or a reduction 
of foreign exchange liabilities. This leads to a reduction of currency mismatches, since 
the depreciation of the domestic currency has a smaller contractionary impact on banks’ 
equity. This result is also consistent with the evidence presented in Tobal (2013) that 
                                                 
16 Besides the fact that inflation in 2009-2010 reached very low levels, the rational for allowing greater 
exchange rate adjustments can also be related to the documentation of smaller pass-through coefficients 
since the implementation of inflation targeting strategies. 
17 For this ratio, the valuation effect of the exchange rate should be muted, and changes should reflect the 
relative holdings of assets (in terms of liabilities) in foreign currency. 
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reports positive correlations between the growth rate of the ratio assets to liabilities and 
domestic currency depreciations for most countries in the region18.  
 
According to our empirical evidence, mismatches’ reductions and domestic currency 
depreciations seem to be simultaneous responses associated to capital outflows. There 
are two possible (non-mutually exclusive) interpretations in terms of the role played by 
capital inflows. First, during outflows, foreign exchange liabilities of banks 
automatically reduce, improving relative asset holdings without an active portfolio 
management by banks. Second, domestic currency depreciations associated to capital 
outflows signal further depreciation expectations that induce an explicit accumulation of 
foreign assets by banks. In any of these two interpretations, causality clearly runs from 
capital outflows to domestic currency depreciation and currency mismatch reduction. 
This view, nonetheless, is clearly at odds with the notion that the reduction of currency 
mismatches has encouraged exchange rate floatation, as Ceballos et. al (2012) suggests. 
In their interpretation, emerging economies were willing to depreciate their domestic 
currencies because of larger positions in foreign assets during the 2000s. This 
hypothesis could have been valid only up to 2007, before capital inflows in the region 
started profusely and significant short foreign exchange positions started to build.      
 
In terms of the other components of banking balance sheets, it is interesting that an 
increase (decrease) in public debt assets is related to a reduction (improvement) in fiscal 
balances. Therefore, any increase in commodity prices that improve fiscal balances has 
its counterpart in the reduction of public debt holdings by banks. This evidence seems to 
comply with the notion that during times of fiscal stress, the government turns to the 
financial system as a source of funding. Regarding loans, only a significant increase in 
aggregate demand is related to a sustained boost in loans, i.e. with an important increase 
in commodity prices. Banking leverage seems to be positively, but weakly related to the 
behavior of loans, but results are not totally clear in this respect. 
 
Finally, the behavior of the stock market in the region varies, depending on the types of 
shocks. For instance, a positive US supply shock translates in an increase of regional 
stock prices, as long as US stock prices boost. In this case, although there are temporary 
capital outflows from the region, local stock markets seem to be more connected to US 
equity prices. On the contrary, when there are adverse financial shocks in the US that 
deprive US stock prices and commodity prices, regional stock prices do not respond 
immediately, but increase significantly after volatility has returned to its original pre-
shocks levels. This occurs in spite of absence of explicit recovery for US stock prices. 
Therefore, one could relate regional stocks markets with booming US stock prices 
(positive US supply shocks), but also with deprived US stock market, once financial 
shocks have passed away. Therefore, a simple characterization of regional stock market 
is ruled out and additional research on this topic might be necessary. Nevertheless, it 
seems clear that regional stock prices do not necessarily relate to capital inflows, as 
someone could intuitively think.       
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
18 In Tobal (2013) calculations of currency mismatch in LA countries are based on banking information 
directly compiled by regional Central Banks. 
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VI. Country heterogeneity: what conditions policy responses? 
 
In this section, we attempt to determine how particular country characteristics have 
affected the magnitude of responses of monetary rates and government expenditures, for 
all identified shocks. Country differences are established in terms of the features that, 
according to the previous discussion, have affected monetary policy and fiscal 
decisions: the existence of an explicit inflation targeting regime, the degree of exchange 
rate flexibility, the degree of foreign currency exposure  (measured as the average ratio 
of foreign assets to liabilities in the banking system), the average size of capital inflows, 
and the relative lack of restrictions in fiscal policy (measured as the average size of the 
fiscal balance in terms of fiscal expenditures). Since these variables intent to capture 
relatively structural characteristics of countries, we use them to discriminate the 
magnitude of response in decision variables. Operationally, we use impulse responses at 
one year horizon, for all countries and all sets of structural parameters19. These impulse 
responses are then regressed against average country specific variables. In order to get a 
clean interpretation of results, we run separate regressions for positive and negative 
responses for each shock, and all shocks considered altogether. Results of OLS 
regressions are shown in appendix 7. Complete accumulated impulse responses of 
monetary interest rates and government expenditures are shown for all countries in 
appendix 8. 
 
Monetary rates 
 
Regarding the responses of monetary rates, the first observation is that the largest 
proportion of responses is associated to countercyclical monetary authority actions. That 
is, there are substantially more positive responses for US expansionary real demand and 
monetary shocks, but more negative responses for the contractionary financial shock20. 
This confirms the remarks made at regional level, indicating that monetary authorities 
tend to increase interest rates during expansions of the domestic aggregate demand, but 
reduce them during contractions. In terms of countries, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Mexico and Perú tend to show countercyclical interest rate responses, while 
Argentina, Uruguay and Venezuela do not. Because the absolute coefficient values 
associated to the inflation targeting dummies are clearly bigger than the rest of 
individual coefficients, for countercyclical responses, countries with inflation targeting 
regimes modify interest rates much more intensely than Argentina and Venezuela21. In 
this sense, results are consistent with the statement that the implementation of inflation 
targeting strategies significantly conditions the exercise of monetary policy.  
 
In terms of the degree of floatation of the exchange rate, more flexible arrangements 
tend to moderate the magnitude of interest rate variations, but only in the margin. This 
finding could be consistent with the idea that part of the adjustments to shocks can be 
                                                 
19  Since impulse response analysis are based on 156 accepted draws of Q’s, out of 2 million of potential 
candidates, implicitly, there are 156 sets of structural parameters that satisfy sign restrictions. Responses 
of all countries per shock add up to a total of 1,404. 
20 For US expansionary supply shocks, interest rate responses are equally divided among positive and 
negative values. This is because commodity prices and aggregate demand fluctuate from negative to 
positive values along the impulse response horizon. So, it is difficult to interpret responses associated to 
this shock. 
21  A country characteristic intensifies a type of response if its coefficient (or its net effect: the coefficient 
times the sign of the characteristic) has the same sign as the regression constant.  
19 
 
absorbed by the exchange rate. When this is the case, the role played by monetary 
policy reactions diminishes.  
 
The second larger (absolute) coefficient values are those corresponding to the average 
size of capital inflows during the period. Since this variable can take positive and 
negative values, countries with greater capital inflows will moderate the magnitude of 
countercyclical interest rate responses, while countries with average capital outflows, 
will respond with stronger countercyclical interest rate movements. It is important to 
recall that the average capital inflow indicator reflects if the country is typically a net 
lender (has outflows) or borrower (has inflows) of capital. One possible interpretation is 
that countries with structurally positive flows could employ other policy instruments 
(such as reserve requirements, capital taxation or sterilization instruments) to deal with 
the expansionary monetary effects of inflows or foreign exchange interventions. 
Therefore, movements of interest rates can be moderated with respect to countries that 
face average capital outflows. According to these coefficients, Bolivia, Colombia and 
Mexico seem to respond less countercyclically than Brazil, Chile and Peru in terms of 
interest rates. Because compiling information regarding the particular policy strategies 
of countries to capital inflows is beyond the scope of this paper, interpretations to this 
respect are merely a working hypothesis that need further test.     
 
The coefficients values associated with the average foreign currency exposure in the 
banking system, although statistically significant, are very close to zero. Likewise the 
degree of exchange rate flexibility, coefficient signs indicate that having longer foreign 
asset positions will moderate the countercyclical responses of monetary policy rates. 
There is no a priori interpretation for this result. 
 
Government expenditures 
 
Different from the former case, the positive/negative allocation of responses (draws) for 
government expenditures does not follow a countercyclical pattern. In fact, a slightly 
greater proportion of positive responses are registered for US expansionary real demand 
and monetary policy shocks (55% and 53% respectively), while 63% of negative 
responses are observed for the contractionary financial shock. Interpretation of this 
aspect of results would point out that fiscal policies tend to be more procyclical than 
countercyclical. For the expansionary US supply shock, most responses (73%) are 
negative, indicating that expenditures are falling after a year of the shock, probably due 
to the initial drop observed in commodity prices. This response is clearly procyclical.   
 
Another difference with respect to monetary policy responses is that, except for some 
cases, coefficients values associated to inflation targeting dummies and floatation 
indexes tend to be not statistically significant, precluding a clear interpretation of 
results. In the margin, countries with more flexible exchange rate regimes are slightly 
less procyclical in their fiscal response.  
 
Interpretations of coefficient values for average capital inflows or fiscal balance 
variables are relatively more complicated in this case than in the former, not only 
because variables can have positive and negative values, but also because procyclical 
and countercyclical responses are more evenly distributed in the sample. So, we cannot 
focus only on one type of responses. Recall that a country characteristic reinforces the 
magnitude of a given type of response if its effect (variable x coefficient value) has the 
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same sign as the regression constant. For instance, countries with average capital 
inflows will respond with stronger government expenditures movements, independently 
of the direction of the response. That is, in countries with structurally positive flows, 
expenditure variations will be more countercyclical or more procyclical than in 
countries with average capital outflows. This is suggesting that the presence of inflows 
tend to magnify the responses of fiscal policy, independently of its intention. So, while 
the direction or intention of fiscal responses could depend on the existing fiscal 
institutions in each country, the presence of capital inflows seem to reinforce such 
responses.  
 
Finally, when countries engage in procyclical fiscal policy responses, the existence of 
average fiscal surpluses intensifies the magnitude responses. On the contrary, when 
countries implement countercyclical fiscal policy responses, the presence of structural 
deficits is associated with larger magnitude responses.  
 
Since responses of fiscal expenditures are difficult to rationalize in terms of econometric 
results, we turn to check which countries tend to react procyclically or 
countercyclically. We do this by checking the list of countries that enter in each 
regression and examining complete impulse-responses for individual countries. We find 
that Bolivia, Colombia, Mexico and Uruguay are the countries that tend to engage in 
countercyclical fiscal policies, while Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela 
implement mostly procyclical fiscal policies. Coincidently, Bolivia, Colombia, Mexico 
and Uruguay are the countries with average positive capital flows in the sample. In this 
sense, one could conjecture that having capital inflows make countries more willing to 
use fiscal policy countercyclically. 
 
The role of average fiscal balances seems to relate more to the intensity of responses. 
While major countercyclical responses are exhibited by Bolivia and Colombia, which 
have average deficits for the estimation sample, Argentina, Brasil and Perú show 
average fiscal surpluses and stronger procyclical responses.       
 
What conditions policy responses? 
 
Country analysis suggests fiscal policy responses are by far more heterogeneous than 
monetary policy responses. As already pointed out, the implementation of inflation 
targeting strategies has greatly conditioned the exercise of monetary policy, making 
interest rate decisions homogeneously more countercyclical.  
 
A second element that arises is that persistent capital inflows in certain countries have 
conditioned the application of both, monetary and fiscal policy decisions. In the case of 
monetary policy, the countercyclical use of interest rates becomes more moderate, 
presumably because there are other set of policy instruments that deal with the 
undesirable effects of inflows. In terms of fiscal policy these countries seem also more 
willing to undertake countercyclical fiscal policies. 
 
Finally, although in the margin, countries with more flexible exchange rates seem to use 
monetary and fiscal policy instruments less intensively. 
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VII. Conclusions 
Currently, there is a large body of the literature developing to answer related questions 
to the ones posed by this research. In this sense, consensuses are still building using 
different methodological approaches. In this paper, we take the stand of empirical 
modeling in order to try to answer such questions. The modeling combines elements of 
the SVAR, dynamic factors model and FAVAR literature, in order to adequately 
address the dynamic problems of endogeneity and identification of shocks. The answers 
provided by the paper spread in two directions. 
 
The first important result is that the references to external shocks to the LA region can 
perfectly be addressed in terms of US domestic shocks. This is the case, because US 
shocks are indeed intertwined with the behavior of commodity prices. Extending the 
results of Anzuini et.al (2012), we find that not only US monetary policy shocks have 
played a role in the behavior of commodity prices, but also supply, real demand and 
financial shocks have done so. Channels of transmission from the US economy to 
commodity markets are multiple, and do not seem to involve the behavior of a unique 
variable. As a corollary for policy evaluation in the region, this result suggests that 
monitoring US performance could provide forward information on the external 
conditions for the region. 
 
The second set of results reinforce the view that external conditions play a substantial 
role in the performance of the region, as several authors have suggested (Canova 2005, 
Izquierdo, Romero and Talvi 2008, Addler and Magud 2013, among others). 
Nonetheless, the performance in real activity growth, inflation and external variables 
seem to rely heavily on commodity prices more than in any other variable. In this story, 
commodity prices adjustments are also likely to provide a focal point for global capitals, 
and consequently induce significant capital inflows (outflows) for increasing (dropping) 
commodity prices. Both, movements in commodity prices and capital flows, regionally 
behave as huge aggregate demand shocks that trigger policy responses in the region. 
Independently of their origin, the presence of capital flows in the last decade has posed 
important challenges for the conduct of policies. On one hand, capital flows have 
represented an additional burden for monetary policy to dampen cyclical aggregate 
demand fluctuations. Also, capital flows have been accompanied with more intense 
foreign exchange interventions that not necessarily had the expected results. This 
tension has likely been resolved with a general progressive implementation of more 
flexible exchange rate systems, while some countries, facing persistent capital inflows, 
have also resort to using other policy instruments.   
 
In terms of fiscal policy, the evidence is mixed for determining its overall motivation at 
regional level. Nonetheless, individually, there are some countries already implementing 
countercyclical fiscal policies. Since the empirical evidence suggests that the behavior 
of commodity prices has largely conditioned fiscal balances, fiscal authorities have 
probably had some degrees of freedom to improve fiscal performance with respect to 
past crises. Nevertheless, there presumably exist other institutional rigidities that avoid a 
flexible management of fiscal expenditures in order to generate a proper countercyclical 
fiscal response to external shocks.  
 
Finally, the behavior of commodity prices has also linked with the response of banking 
balance sheets, especially in terms of foreign assets and public debt holdings. Also in 
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this case, capital outflows seemed to have played a role in reducing currency 
mismatches in the context of domestic currency depreciations. 
 
Summarizing all these interpretations, we could state that the LA experience in the last 
decade has probably related to a new combination of circumstances. These 
circumstances are adequately summarized by the behavior of commodity prices, and the 
resulting capital flows that emerge in a more connected global economy. In our view, 
these connections come in part from the augmented links between the US economy and 
commodity markets. In terms of the regional policies, although more sophisticated 
responses have been implemented, results in final variables seem mainly driven by the 
magnitude and duration of commodity booms and capital inflows. Under this 
perception, the resilience to the subprime crisis is mainly the combination of a 
prolonged prior commodity boom and a relatively short posterior bust.           
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Appendix  1. Regional Indicators 
 
The analysis of the LA region as a whole, it requires the creation of regional indicators 
for the variables of interest. These indicators can be constructed ex-post, if estimations 
are carried out in a country by country basis, or ex-ante, if regional estimation is 
undertaken. In this paper, the estimation we implement treats the region as a whole, and 
it uses individual countries’ information and aggregate measures simultaneously. 
Therefore, the selection of an aggregation criterion must be addressed.  
 
Among the possible candidates, we can consider basically two forms of aggregation: 
medians and weighted means. Medians usually tend to be adequate and simple, unless 
all series considered tend to be very noisy or erratic, as in the case of capital inflows or 
fiscal expenditure series. Weighted averages can solve this problem, if weights are more 
statistical, and less historical or structural. We chose an aggregation that resembles the 
notion of stochastic pooling, that is, we use the inverse of the volatility of the series as 
our benchmark weight22. 
 
One important element in the discussion of the regional resilience to shocks is the 
behavior of capital inflows. However this statistic is not available in monthly basis 
(except for Chile). We address this problem by constructing a proxy of yearly 
accumulated net capital inflows using the account identity: 
 
StockIRInitial
onAccumulatiIR
StockIRInitial
InflowsCapitalNetbalanceTrade   
 
In this case, net accumulated capital inflows (for a year span) are the result of evaluating 
the difference between the relative accumulation of reserves and the relative size of the 
net export flows (all in terms of international reserves at the beginning of the period).   
 
The stance of regional fiscal policy is the weighted average of the annual growth of 
government expenditures. In this case, the annual variation is computed based on the 
yearly accumulated expenditures.  
 
The stance of regional monetary policy refers to the weighted average of the (absolute) 
change in the short term money market rate in the last year.  
 
Data on real activity indicators, consumer price index, exports, imports, exchange rates, 
international reserves, interest rates, monetary aggregates and fiscal variables come 
from publications of Central Banks of the region. Data on countries’ financial systems 
corresponds to IMF statistics referred as “other depositary corporation surveys”. Data 
on commodity prices (fuel and non-fuel) are also provided by the IMF. 
                                                 
22 In most cases, this weighted average scheme delivers results closer to the median of the pool of 
countries, and it differentiates strongly from simple mean indicators. 
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yLA: regional annual real growth indicator, PLA: regional annual inflation, EXLA: 
annual export growth, CIFLA: regional proxy for capital inflows (as a share of 
international reserves), MRLA: regional annual variation of short term rates (in 
percentage points), GXLA: annual government expenditure growth.  
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Appendix  2. Sign restriction identification 
 
Sign restriction identification starts by finding a set of orthogonal errors   in the 
estimated model  (4) : t
RW
ttt eYZZ   11 . Orthogonalization is carried out by 
finding any matrix decomposition that satisfies 'ˆˆˆ VV . In this way, orthogonal errors 
can be retrieved from reduced form residuals through tt eV ˆˆˆ
1 . We use the Cholesky 
decomposition of ˆ  to obtain Vˆ .  Because structural shocks are strictly identified by 
their expected effect on economic variables, orthogonal shocks may not necessarily 
qualify as such. Therefore, the way sign restriction identification works is by combining 
orthogonal shocks in such a way that the resulting structural (also orthogonal) shocks 
have the properties imposed by the researcher. Operationally, if we assume that 
structural shocks are related to orthogonal shocks through a matrix Q , such that 
tt uQ  then, we can write structural impulse responses of Z as   QVhZRI h ˆˆˆ 1  for 
the hth horizon. However, Q  must be a rotation matrix, which by definition satisfies 
QQ' . In this way, we can always write 'ˆˆ'ˆ'ˆˆ VVVQQV   and the properties of 
the estimated covariance matrix are preserved. According to Rubio, Waggoner and Zha 
(2010), Q can be obtained from applying the QR decomposition to a uniform random 
matrix.  
Since Z contains factors for the LA block, and factors cannot be directly interpreted, 
impulse responses on final variables are given by     hIRXhIRZ LAUS , , where 
   hIRFhIRX LA  . Therefore, sign restriction identification consists on finding 
several (enough) rotation matrices Qs that satisfy the restrictions imposed on impulse 
responses of final variables23. Notice that this procedure avoids imposing null 
restrictions on contemporaneous correlations of variables, as it is the case when using 
Cholesky decomposition as a structural identification procedure. In other words, 
QVˆˆ   does not exhibits zero restrictions, as it does Vˆ .  
Because we want to identify structural US shocks, we strictly identify these shocks 
using information coming from US variables. On this account, we impose a block 
diagonal form to matrix Q, such that 


2
1
0
0
Q
Q
. Notice that the non-zero blocks of Q, 
say Q1 and Q2, also satisfy 11 'QQ  and 22 'QQ . Since the US economy is 
characterized by six variables, in our model Q1 and Q2 are 6x6 matrices. The use of this 
block diagonal structure for Q is a generalization of the procedure used in Mumtaz and 
Surico (2009), which define Q as 


I
Q
0
01 , in order to distinguish international from 
domestic shocks, in a FAVAR for the UK economy augmented with international 
factors. In this model, we only identify four structural external shocks, out of six 
potential external shocks. We do not attempt to identify any LA regional shock.  
Restrictions on impulse responses are applied for six consecutive months to identify 
sufficiently long lasting structural shocks. 
 
                                                 
23  For each potential draw of Q that generates impulse responses, identification entails to keeps only 
those draws that satisfy restrictions imposed, but for all identified shocks simultaneously. This is so in 
order to preserve orthogonality among structural shocks.  
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Appendix  3. Accumulated impulse responses of the US economy and 
commodity prices to US domestic shocks 
 
US expansionary supply shock 
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US expansionary (real) demand shock 
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yUS: growth of industrial activity; PUS: inflation; MONPOL: monetary policy indicator; STKUS: 
S&P500 index growth; VIX: volatility index; PCOM: Commodity price growth. Lines represent the 84th, 
50th and 16th percentiles of all impulse responses that satisfied sign restrictions. 
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US expansionary monetary policy shock 
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US contractionary financial shock 
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yUS: growth of industrial activity; PUS: inflation; MONPOL: monetary policy indicator; STKUS: 
S&P500 index growth; VIX: volatility index; PCOM: Commodity price growth. Lines represent the 84th, 
50th and 16th percentiles of all impulse responses that satisfied sign restrictions. 
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Appendix  4. Weight of selected factors in LA variables’ variance 
   
 
Variable 
Name
Variance 
share of the 
common 
component
Variance 
share of the 
idiosyncratic 
component
Average of the 
common 
component 
variance share
yarg 78,1% 21,9%
ybra 78,0% 22,0%
ychl 60,9% 39,1%
ycol 91,1% 8,9%
yecu 35,3% 64,7%
ymex 82,0% 18,0%
yper 75,4% 24,6%
yurg 72,1% 27,9%
yven 92,3% 7,7%
parg 93,3% 6,7%
pbol 85,5% 14,5%
pbra 73,9% 26,1%
pchl 94,6% 5,4%
pcol 88,2% 11,8%
pecu 86,9% 13,1%
pmex 62,2% 37,8%
pper 89,1% 10,9%
purg 59,8% 40,2%
pven 82,7% 17,3%
exarg 77,6% 22,4%
exbol 64,9% 35,1%
exbra 79,6% 20,4%
exchl 81,3% 18,7%
excol 69,0% 31,0%
execu 71,2% 28,8%
exmex 87,3% 12,7%
exper 77,7% 22,3%
exurg 59,4% 40,6%
exven 60,8% 39,2%
imarg 90,9% 9,1%
imbol 72,9% 27,1%
imbra 84,9% 15,1%
imchl 91,1% 8,9%
imcol 83,5% 16,5%
imecu 73,8% 26,2%
immex 88,2% 11,8%
imper 87,7% 12,3%
imurg 61,4% 38,6%
imven 74,6% 25,4%
irarg 71,9% 28,1%
irbol 73,5% 26,5%
irbra 80,2% 19,8%
irchl 60,0% 40,0%
ircol 47,4% 52,6%
irecu 66,6% 33,4%
irmex 67,9% 32,1%
irper 79,9% 20,1%
irurg 83,7% 16,3%
irven 71,2% 28,8%
erarg 78,3% 21,7%
erbol 96,0% 4,0%
erbra 79,3% 20,7%
erchl 51,7% 48,3%
ercol 74,4% 25,6%
ermex 79,1% 20,9%
erper 63,3% 36,7%
erurg 77,4% 22,6%
erven 45,8% 54,2%
cifarg 88,0% 12,0%
cifbol 51,6% 48,4%
cifbra 83,9% 16,1%
cifchl 94,3% 5,7%
cifcol 60,8% 39,2%
cifecu 50,5% 49,5%
cifmex 60,7% 39,3%
cifper 64,6% 35,4%
cifurg 80,2% 19,8%
cifven 85,8% 14,2%
gxarg 82,8% 17,2%
gxbol 91,0% 9,0%
gxbra 51,9% 48,1%
gxcol 26,1% 73,9%
gxecu 92,2% 7,8%
gxmex 73,0% 27,0%
gxper 44,9% 55,1%
gxurga 63,9% 36,1%
gxven 83,2% 16,8%
fbarg 92,1% 7,9%
fbbol 78,9% 21,1%
fbbra 88,1% 11,9%
fbcol 84,2% 15,8%
fbecu 70,6% 29,4%
fbmex 91,7% 8,3%
fbper 94,4% 5,6%
fburg 90,1% 9,9%
fbven 83,0% 17,0%
m2arg 84,1% 15,9%
m2bol 92,6% 7,4%
m2bra 90,3% 9,7%
m2chl 82,8% 17,2%
m2col 75,0% 25,0%
m2ecu 76,3% 23,7%
m2mex 65,3% 34,7%
m2per 85,8% 14,2%
m2urg 44,6% 55,4%
m2ven 81,5% 18,5%
Government 
expenditure 
growth
Fiscal balance 
as a share of 
government 
expenditure
M2  growth
Real activity 
growth
Inflation
Export growth
Import  
growth
International 
reserves 
growth
Exchange rate  
(Dom/$) 
growth
73,9%
81,6%
72,9%
80,9%
Capital 
inflows 
indicator
70,2%
71,7%
72,0%
67,7%
85,9%
77,8%
Variable 
Name
Variance 
share of the 
common 
component
Variance 
share of the 
idiosyncratic 
component
Average of the 
common 
component 
variance share
lrarg 85,4% 14,6%
lrbol 21,9% 78,1%
lrbra 83,7% 16,3%
lrchl 89,7% 10,3%
lrcol 80,5% 19,5%
lrecu 65,4% 34,6%
lrmex 58,3% 41,7%
lrper 78,1% 21,9%
lrurg 86,7% 13,3%
lrven 89,7% 10,3%
mrarg 75,1% 24,9%
mrbol 70,1% 29,9%
mrbra 88,0% 12,0%
mrchl 89,3% 10,7%
mrcol 92,8% 7,2%
mrmex 55,9% 44,1%
mrper 82,8% 17,2%
mrurg 69,3% 30,7%
mrven 42,0% 58,0%
stkarg 82,9% 17,1%
stkbra 88,8% 11,2%
stkchl 78,5% 21,5%
stkcol 80,8% 19,2%
stkmex 93,2% 6,8%
stkper 91,9% 8,1%
nfaarg 82,9% 17,1%
nfabol 77,2% 22,8%
nfabra 57,6% 42,4%
nfachl 53,1% 46,9%
nfacol 46,4% 53,6%
nfaecu 76,9% 23,1%
nfamex 24,8% 75,2%
nfaper 21,9% 78,1%
nfaurg 44,7% 55,3%
nfaven 57,3% 42,7%
pudarg 78,0% 22,0%
pudbol 45,7% 54,3%
pudbra 80,5% 19,5%
pudchl 78,9% 21,1%
pudcol 62,9% 37,1%
pudecu 80,5% 19,5%
pudmex 83,0% 17,0%
pudurg 70,3% 29,7%
pudven 65,0% 35,0%
loansarg 90,4% 9,6%
loansbol 81,8% 18,2%
loansbra 85,4% 14,6%
loanschl 84,0% 16,0%
loanscol 87,9% 12,1%
loansecu 87,8% 12,2%
loansmex 88,6% 11,4%
loansper 90,0% 10,0%
loansurg 79,6% 20,4%
loansven 75,9% 24,1%
shlarg 97,5% 2,5%
shlbol 88,0% 12,0%
shlbra 98,8% 1,2%
shlchl 75,8% 24,2%
shlcol 92,4% 7,6%
shlecu 75,9% 24,1%
shlmex 62,1% 37,9%
shlper 87,1% 12,9%
shlurg 73,1% 26,9%
shlven 89,7% 10,3%
levarg 91,8% 8,2%
levbol 94,4% 5,6%
levbra 80,3% 19,7%
levchl 66,5% 33,5%
levcol 90,1% 9,9%
levecu 75,3% 24,7%
levmex 81,0% 19,0%
levurg 87,6% 12,4%
levven 94,6% 5,4%
cmarg 32,4% 67,6%
cmbol 59,5% 40,5%
cmbra 74,3% 25,7%
cmchi 77,3% 22,7%
cmcol 46,3% 53,7%
cmmex 78,1% 21,9%
cmper 69,3% 30,7%
cmuru 79,2% 20,8%
cmven 44,1% 55,9%
y 90,1% 9,9%
p 96,4% 3,6%
ex 91,6% 8,4%
im 95,4% 4,6%
ir 90,5% 9,5%
er 83,0% 17,0%
cif 67,1% 32,9%
gx 66,1% 33,9%
fb 96,5% 3,5%
m2 93,4% 6,6%
lr 89,2% 10,8%
mr 92,1% 7,9%
stk 95,1% 4,9%
fa 45,7% 54,3%
pud 80,2% 19,8%
loans 97,4% 2,6%
sh 58,5% 41,5%
shl 94,1% 5,9%
lev 75,3% 24,7%
cm 80,7% 19,3%
Currency 
mismatch 
indicator 
growth in the 
financial 
system
Regional 
Indicators 83,9%
62,3%
Loans growth 
in the financial 
system
73,9%
73,9%
Loan interest 
rate variation
Monetary 
policy rate 
variation 
Stock market 
index growth
Foreign asset 
growth in the 
financial 
system
Public Debt 
growth in the 
financial 
system
86,0%
54,3%
71,6%
85,2%
84,0%
84,6%
Share of loans 
in the financial 
system
Leverage in the 
financial 
system
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Appendix  5. Accumulated impulse responses for the LA region 
 
 
US expansionary supply shock   US expansionary demand shock 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
YLA: real activity growth, PLA: inflation, EXLA: export growth, IR: international reserves growth; 
ERLA: exchange rate growth (Domestic/US$); CIFLA: capital inflows indicator; GXLA: government 
expenditure growth; FBLA: fiscal balance as a share of expenditures; M2LA: M2 growth; LRLA: loan 
interest rate change; MRLA: monetary rate change; STKLA: stock index growth; FALA: foreign asset 
growth; PUDLA: public debt growth; LOANSLA: loan growth; SHLLA: share of loans with respect to 
assets(FA+PUD+LOANS); LEVLA: leverage (assets/equity); CMLA: currency mismatch indicator (FX 
assets/liabilities) growth. All variables are expressed in standardized units. Lines represent the 84th, 50th 
and 16th percentiles of all impulse responses that satisfied sign restrictions. 
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 US expansionary monetary shock     US contractionary financial shock  
 
  
  
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
YLA: real activity growth, PLA: inflation, EXLA: export growth, IR: international reserves growth; 
ERLA: exchange rate growth (Domestic/US$); CIFLA: capital inflows indicator; GXLA: government 
expenditure growth; FBLA: fiscal balance as a share of expenditures; M2LA: M2 growth; LRLA: loan 
interest rate change; MRLA: monetary rate change; STKLA: stock index growth; FALA: foreign asset 
growth; PUDLA: public debt growth; LOANSLA: loan growth; SHLLA: share of loans with respect to 
assets(FA+PUD+LOANS); LEVLA: leverage (assets/equity); CMLA: currency mismatch indicator (FX 
assets/liabilities) growth. All variables are expressed in standardized units. Lines represent the 84th, 50th 
and 16th percentiles of all impulse responses that satisfied sign restrictions. 
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Appendix  6. Regional capital inflows and floatation indexes 
 
 
 
Floatation index (including interest rate variability) 
  
Complete sample    
2004-2012 
2004-2006 2007-2008 2009-2010 2011-2012 
Chile 0,01 0,02 0,05 0,00 0,01 
Bolivia 0,03 0,02 0,09 0,02 0,00 
Perú 0,06 0,04 0,21 0,06 0,02 
Uruguay  0,07 0,04 0,13 0,30 0,36 
Argentina 0,11 0,05 0,07 0,23 0,18 
Venezuela  0,13 0,12 0,40 0,19 0,07 
Mexico 0,27 0,12 0,49 0,40 1,77 
Colombia 0,28 0,36 0,57 0,49 0,17 
Brasil 0,35 0,25 0,33 0,54 0,34 
            
Average 0,15 0,11 0,26 0,25 0,33 
 
Floatation index (including only exchange rate and reserve variability) 
  
Complete sample     
2004-2012 
2004-2006 2007-2008 2009-2010 2011-2012 
Chile 0,14 0,31 0,08 0,17 0,13 
Bolivia 0,15 0,06 0,52 0,36 0,11 
Uruguay 0,28 0,19 0,49 1,16 0,58 
Perú 0,28 0,17 0,35 0,50 0,20 
Argentina 0,61 0,32 0,13 1,34 0,36 
Brasil 0,78 0,73 0,55 1,86 1,51 
Mexico 0,95 0,73 0,77 1,02 2,22 
Venezuela 1,06 1,13 1,58 3,14 2,30 
Colombia 1,53 1,08 1,26 7,52 1,12 
            
Average 0,64 0,52 0,64 1,90 0,95 
 
Floatation indexes are computed as ratios of standard deviations of series, all of which are expressed as 
annual growth rates. These indexes measure the relative variability of the exchange rate in terms of the 
variability of international reserves and interest rates:     MRgrowthdsIRgrowthds
ERgrowthdsFI
....
..

. For 
Venezuela, we use the non-official exchange rate growth. 
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Appendix  7. Results of OLS regressions for determining country 
heterogeneity. 
 
Dependent variable: monetary rate responses of all countries at 12 months 
 
  
Expansionary 
supply shock 
Expansionary 
demand shock 
Expansionary 
monetary policy 
shock 
Contractionary 
financial shock All shocks 
  Positive responses 
c 0,074*** (0,004) 
 0,015** 
(0,006) 
0,020*** 
(0,004)  
0,012*** 
(0,001) 
0,017*** 
(0,004)  
Inflation targeting 
dummy - 
0,101*** 
(0,006)  
 0,036*** 
(0,003)  - 
 0,065*** 
(0,004) 
Floatation index -0,004 (0,004) 
 -0,012*** 
(0,004) 
 -0,008*** 
(0,002)  - 
-0,008*** 
(0,002)  
FX Assets/Liabilities -0,005*** (0,001) 
 -0,006*** 
(0,001) 
 -0,003*** 
(0,000)  - 
 -0,004*** 
(0,000) 
CIF Indicator -0.025*** (0,007) 
 -0,081*** 
(0,006) 
 -0,0286*** 
(0,003)  - 
-0,049*** 
(0,003) 
R2 0,050  0,290  0,172  - 0,184  
N° Obs.  696 1198   1125 101  3120 
Proportion of draws 0.496 0.853 0.80.1 0.072 0.555 
Negative responses 
c -0,092*** (0,003)  
-0,011*** 
(0,002)  
 -0,010*** 
(0,002) 
-0,034*** 
(0,006)  
 -0,392*** 
(0,004) 
Inflation targeting 
dummy 
 0,045*** 
(0,003) 
 -0,001 
(0,003)
 -0,002 
(0,002)
 -0,123*** 
(0,006) 
 -0,084*** 
(0,004)
Floatation index  0,018*** (0,003) 
 -0,005** 
(0,002) 
 -0,001 
(0,001) 
 0,020*** 
(0,004) 
0,018*** 
(0,003)  
FX Assets/Liabilities  0,003*** (0,000) 
 0,001*** 
(0,000) 
 0,001*** 
(0,000) 
 0,008*** 
(0,001) 
 0,008*** 
(0,001) 
CIF Indicator  -0,004 (0,003) 
 0,007** 
(0,003) 
 0,007*** 
(0,002) 
 0,105*** 
(0,006) 
 0,093*** 
(0,004) 
R2  0,431  0,095 0,093   0,355  0,278 
N° Obs.  708  206  279  1303  2496 
Proportion of draws 0.504 0.147 0.199 0.928 0.445 
 
*, **  and *** denote coefficient significance at 10%, 5% y 1%, respectively. Standard deviations of 
parameter estimators are in parentheses. The variable “Inflation targeting dummy” was dropped from the 
regression when all countries in the sample satisfied the criterion. All the positive responses in the 
contractionary financial shock correspond to a single country (Venezuela). 
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Dependent variable: government expenditure responses of all countries at 12 
months 
 
  
Expansionary 
supply shock 
Expansionary 
demand shock
Expansionary 
monetary 
policy shock 
Contractionary 
financial shock All shocks 
  Positive responses 
C 0,025*** (0,007)  
 0,035*** 
(0,003) 
0,028*** 
(0,002)  
0,006 
(0,014) 
 0,040*** 
(0,002) 
Inflation targeting 
dummy 
 0,062*** 
(0,007) 
 -0,007** 
(0,003) 
 -0,003 
(0,002) - 
 -0,000 
(0,002) 
Floatation index  -0,058*** (0,005) 
 -0,010** 
(0,004) 
 -0,007** 
(0,003) 
0,014 
(0,024) 
 -0,002 
(0,002) 
FX Assets/Liabilities  -0,006*** 0,001 
 0,010*** 
(0,001) 
 0,002*** 
(0,001) 
0,010** 
(0,005) 
 0,002*** 
(0,000) 
CIF Indicator  -0,107*** (0,012) 
 0,051*** 
(0,010) 
 0,011** 
(0,005) 
0,078*** 
(0,021) 
0,020*** 
(0,003) 
Fiscal balance -0,166*** (0,027) 
0,189*** 
(0,034) 
0,019 
(0,018) 
-0,110 
(0,119) 
 -0,035*** 
(0,009) 
R2  0,597  0,190  0,093 0,262 0,061  
N° Obs.  381  766  739  525  2411 
Proportion of draws 0.271 0.545 0.526 0.374 0.429 
Negative responses 
C  -0,049*** (0,002) 
-0,015*** 
(0,005) 
 -0,013*** 
(0,003) 
-0,052*** 
(0,003)  
 -0,053*** 
(0,002) 
Inflation targeting 
dummy 
 0,028*** 
(0,004) 
-0,008* 
(0,005) 
-0,001 
(0,002)  
 0,029*** 
(0,003) 
 0,031*** 
(0,002) 
Floatation index -0,032*** (0,003)  
-0,005 
(0,003) 
 -0,000 
(0,002) 
 0,007* 
(0,004) 
 -0,013*** 
(0,002) 
FX Assets/Liabilities  -0,001 (0,001) 
-0,004*** 
(0,001) 
 -0,001*** 
(0,000) 
 -0,017*** 
(0,001) 
 -0,003*** 
(0,000) 
CIF Indicator  -0,053*** (0,006) 
-0,050*** 
(0,005) 
 -0,018*** 
(0,002) 
 -0,114*** 
(0,010) 
 -0,037*** 
(0,003) 
Fiscal balance -0,029** (0,012) 
0,067*** 
(0,018) 
0,028*** 
(0,009) 
-0,282*** 
(0,037) 
0,019** 
(0,008) 
R2  0,219 0,278  0,176  0,400 0,093  
N° Obs.  1023 638  665  879  3205 
Proportion of draws 0.729 0.455 0.474 0.626 0.571 
 
*, **  and *** denote coefficient significance at 10%, 5% y 1%, respectively. Standard deviations of 
parameter estimators are in parentheses. The variable “Inflation targeting dummy” was dropped from the 
regression when all countries in the sample satisfied the criterion. 
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Appendix 8. Countries accumulated impulse responses 
 
Monetary interest rate responses to US expansionary supply shock 
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Monetary interest rate responses to US expansionary real demand shock 
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Monetary interest rate responses to US expansionary monetary shock 
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Monetary interest rate responses to US contractionary financial shock 
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Fiscal expenditures responses to US expansionary supply shock 
 
               Argentina GX                         Bolivia GX                       Brazil GX 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                Colombia GX            Ecuador GX         Mexico GX 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                    Peru GX            Uruguay GX     Venezuela GX 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fiscal expenditures responses to US expansionary real demand shock 
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Fiscal expenditures responses to US expansionary monetary shock 
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Fiscal expenditures responses to US contractionary financial shock 
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